A strategic shortcut: the Kra canal and the anguish of Malacca

Maritime geopolitics is once again emerging as a central field of contemporary strategic analysis. The concentration of trade flows, the energy interdependence of the major Asian powers and the naval rise of China have put maritime routes back at the heart of international rivalries. In this context, Southeast Asia occupies a nodal position, structured around several strategic crossing points, foremost among which is the Strait of Malacca. It is precisely this centrality that explains the renewed interest in the Isthmus of Kra canal project, a hypothetical infrastructure connecting the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand. Although this project has never gone beyond the stage of study, it already exerts a significant influence on regional maritime strategies, revealing the tensions, vulnerabilities and ambitions that run through the Asian maritime order.

THE KRA CANAL : A GEOGRAPHICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSTANT OF MARITIME ASIA

The idea of drilling the isthmus of Kra is part of a long geopolitical temporality. From the 17th century, this narrow land corridor, about forty kilometres wide at its narrowest point, was seen as a natural shortcut between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. In the modern era, European merchants and explorers already identified its strategic potential, before the colonial powers, notably British and French, no longer concretely envisaged the creation of a canal. These projects remain a dead letter, however, both due to financial and technical costs as well as geopolitical reluctance, with London particularly fearing to undermine Singapore’s dominant position in regional trade. This permanence of the project highlights an essential reality: Kra’s strategic value lies less in its immediate feasibility than in its geographical position. As the geopolitician Robert D. Kaplan points out, "geography does not dictate strategic choices, but it sets their limits." In this sense, Kra constitutes a structural potentiality of the Asian maritime space, regularly reactivated as globalization increases the pressure on existing routes.

In the 21st century, the project experiences a notable reformulation. Faced with the environmental constraints and colossal investments that a traditional maritime canal would entail, the Thai authorities are now favouring the option of a land bridge, based on a multimodal logistics corridor linking two deep-water ports by rail and highways. This alternative would reduce transit times by two to three days compared with the passage through Malacca. If the form differs, the strategic objective remains identical: capture a part of global maritime flows and reposition Thailand in the regional logistics architecture.

THE STRAT OF MALACCA, BETWEEN STRATEGIC CENTRALITY AND STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY

The interest in the Kra canal cannot be dissociated from the centrality of the Strait of Malacca in contemporary globalization. More than 90,000 ships pass through each year, representing about 30% of global maritime trade. The strait is also a vital energy corridor, with nearly 15 million barrels of oil transported daily, mainly to China, Japan and South Korea. This exceptional concentration of flows gives Malacca a structuring role in the global economy. However, this centrality is also a source of vulnerabilities. The strait is narrow, congested, exposed to the risks of piracy, maritime accidents and, above all, geopolitical tensions. Geoffrey Till stresses in this regard that "maritime chokepoints are both vital arteries and strategic pressure points". In a context of increased rivalries between great powers, Malacca thus appears as a potentially contested space, even instrumentalized in the event of a major crisis.

The emergence of an alternative project in Kra, even partial, therefore acts as a symbolic destabilizing factor. A limited diversion of 5 to 10% of maritime traffic would be sufficient to affect regional economic balances, particularly for Singapore, whose prosperity largely relies on its role as a global port and logistics hub. Several analysts believe that the simple debate around Kra contributes to weaken the perception of inevitability in Malacca, by introducing lasting strategic uncertainty into regional calculations.

KRA AND THE CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY : OVERCOMING THE MALACCA DILEMMA

For China, the Kra project has a particular strategic significance. Since the early 2000s, Chinese strategists have been referring to the 'Malacca dilemma' as the country’s excessive dependence on a maritime passage potentially controlled by opposing powers. About 60-70% of China’s energy imports pass through the strait, making it a major point of vulnerability in case of regional conflict or confrontation with the US. In this perspective, the Kra Canal is part of a broader strategy to diversify Chinese trade and energy routes. It complements Eurasian land corridors, Sino-Burmese oil pipelines and Chinese port investments in the Indian Ocean. As noted by analyst Ian Storey, "Beijing is not seeking to replace Malacca, but to multiply the options in order to reduce systemic risks." Kra thus appears as a potential element of this maritime resilience strategy.

Even without an explicit military dimension, the project raises concerns among China’s regional and Western partners. Washington and Tokyo fear that increased Chinese economic involvement will ultimately result in greater strategic influence in Southeast Asia. Kra then becomes a revealer of Sino-American rivalries, where the logistical infrastructure turns into an indirect instrument of power.

THAILAND, BETWEEN AMBITION FOR A LOGISTICS HUB AND EXPOSURE TO POWER RIVALRIES

At the heart of the project, Thailand is faced with a multidimensional strategic dilemma. Economically, the Kra canal represents a major opportunity. The necessary investments, estimated at between 25 and 30 billion dollars, could sustainably transform the country into a logistics platform linking the Indian Ocean to East Asia. For Bangkok, it would be a lever for regional development and a means of increasing its geopolitical weight within ASEAN. However, these prospects are accompanied by significant risks. The south of Thailand remains marked by persistent political and security tensions, particularly related to separatist movements. The transformation of this region into a major strategic space could exacerbate these fragilities and require a sustainable strengthening of state presence. Moreover, the potential involvement of China places Bangkok in a delicate diplomatic position of balance, exposing it to cross-pressures from the great powers.

Thomas Dos Remedios, for SPECTIO

The statements made are solely those of their authors and do not reflect the position of the Think Tank Spectio.